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ABSTRACT
In the 100 years since the first successful heavier than air
powered flight, aircraft specifically designed for military
applications have proliferated in two overlapping phases.

The first

phase could be considered the development and evolution of aircraft
aerodynamic and power plant performance; basically the ability of an
aircraft to fly higher, faster and be more maneuverable.

As this first

phase reached a plateau in the last 30 years, the second phase,
development of on-board systems, (i.e. radar, FLIR, sensors,
countermeasures, etc.), rose to the forefront of aircraft evolution.
This second phase enabled aircraft with dated performance
characteristics to gain the advantage in a combat scenario due to its
superior ability to detect military targets of interest or remain
undetected itself.

The purpose of this thesis is to describe the next

phase in military aircraft evolution: the integration of military
aviation assets via data links to accomplish a network-centric plan for
sharing and passing critical information between aircraft and ground
stations.

This thesis proposes an Information Systems Management

concept for military aircraft to ensure that aircraft conducting
specific missions maximize their effectiveness by receiving or
transmitting the appropriate information focused towards the overall
success of the military operation.

Discussion begins with current and

future military aviation mission requirements.

Concepts are developed

for connectivity and interface requirements to include human factors
involved with aircrew to system interface as well as discussion of
appropriate frequency spectrum and transmission bandwidth.
ll

Finally the

acquisition strategy and program management requirements to enable such
a concept to come to fruition are reviewed.

Research for this concept

is based on analyzing military mission requirements, review of current
aircraft and systems capabilities, and projection of future mission
requirements and technologies available.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Since the introduction of airpower into military conflicts,
strategists have continued to find more effective ways to utilize
aviation assets for the accomplishment of military objectives.
Initially through the increase in aircraft performance, then with the
advancement of on-board sensors, weapons and survivability equipment,
aviation platforms have evolved into the first-line weapon of choice in
most modern day conflicts.

In recent military operations ranging from

Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf to Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan, airpower has been primary to achieving military
success.

While gains in aircraft performance and improvements in

organic weapons and sensor technology have leveled off in recent years,
the networking of aviation assets in a way to achieve maximum
synergistic effects of all platforms has yet to be fully developed.
The integration of organic sensors, weapons and survivability
equipment first brought a synergistic effect to individual aircraft.
The data linking of aircraft within specific mission areas, primarily
isolated to the air to air and air to ground missions, has achieved
great success recently by closing the "sensor to shooter" loop.
However, these isolated success areas have produced limited scope
systems rather than an efficient network based information sharing
force.

Linking ALL aviation platforms to each other along with the

interface to command and control centers as well as ground and sea
based operators will achieve the ultimate synergistic effects of a
technologically advanced joint military force.
1

The concept of linking military platforms is not _new, and is part
of an overall military t�ansformation plan that has been voiced by
leaders of the armed services.

When discussing the advantages of using

multiple airborne sensors to "build a mosaic" of the battlefield
picture, James Roche, the Secretary of the Air Force, said the service
recognizes that no one sensor system or platform can provide consistent
coverage, "If we try to make any one system solve the problem, it will
get phenomenally expensive and I don't know how we do it."

He adds:

"the challenge is to have an integration of our systems so that we
benefit from their contribution to the battlefield."1

Lieutenant

General John Riggs, lead for the Army's modernization effort, says "the
challenge of the future isn't building a great infantry carrier or
artillery piece, the challenge is building a system that ensures we get
the right information to the right place at the right time on the
battlefield."2

Secretary of the Navy, Gordon England, proclaimed,

"Networked systems and sensors may be more important today than sheer
numbers of weapons platforms."

The Navy recently established the Naval

Network Warfare Command for the purpose of pursuing a concept that
calls for linking ships, aircraft and ground forces in elaborate
electronic networks that allow them to share information about the
enemy instantly.3
Each of the armed services foresees, then, the requirement for a
higher level of network integration.

This thesis will address this

issue by developing a concept for Information Systems Management.

The

purpose of Information Systems Management is to maximize the
1
Michael Sirak, "Interview with James Roche - Secretary of the U.S. Air Force,"
Jane's Defence Weekly, (January 9, 2002)
2
Greg Jaffe, "Military Feels Bandwidth Squeeze as the Satellite Industry
Sputters," Wall Street Journal, (April 10, 2002)
3
Matthew Dolan, "Navy Unveils Its Network Command," Norfolk Virginian-Pilot,
(July 12, 2002)
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effectiveness of aviation platforms in a military theater of
operations.

This concept would be expected to eventually produce a

seamless, end-to-end network comprised of sensors, command and control
nodes, and weapons platforms.
several criteria.

The outcome of this concept must meet

First of all it must encompass all airpower missions

to be truly effective with further links to ground and maritime
platforms or operators.

It must not only take advantage of the latest

technological systems available, but must be capable of being easily
expanded or improved upon as future technologies or mission
requirements develop.

Finally it must be developed with a Joint

Mission Area concept in mind under a Joint Program Office to preclude
issues of incompatibility between individual services or users.
While the emphasis of this thesis is to map out a concept for use
among military aviation assets, the caveat must be included that
linking aviation assets alone is not the complete solution.

While

airpower, through its evolution and maturity, has achieved great
success in recent conflicts, it cannot accomplish military objectives
alone.

Airpower along wit� ground and sea forces must work in a

combined working relationship.

Airpower cannot maneuver in the

classical sense, and it cannot prevent reoccupation by enemy ground
forces.

The connectivity requirement described in this paper must be

continued with links to and between ground and maritime forces to
ensure the objectives of any future military operation are fully
achieved.

3

CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
The first use of an aviation platform during a military operation
by the United States took place during the Civil War in 1861 when the
Union army used a manned balloon to observe Confederate troop
locations.

Even prior to this, the French had successfully used

balloons in campaigns against the Austrians at the end of the 18 th
century. 4

Th� Wright brothers made the first successful controlled,

powered flight in 1903, and in 1908 the Army signed the world's first
contract for the delivery of a military airplane.

As time passed,

innovative airmen began taking firearms aloft and tossing homemade
bombs out of the aircraft.

This led to the installation of fixed

mounted machine guns and bombsites to improve delivery accuracy, and
ultimately to the broad use of airplanes during military operations in
World War I.

General "Billy" Mitchell, Britain's Lord Trenchard, and

the enormously influential Italian General Giulio Douhet were the
leading air power �dvocates who exposed the enormous potential of air
power in future battles. 5

New tactics and procedures were developed in

parallel with the evolution of aircraft performance capabilities.

For

example, U.S. Marine Aviators developed the dive-bombing technique
during operations in Haiti that led to more accurate ordnance delivery
through the dense jungle cover.

It was also during this period that

the Marines were credited with developing primitive close air support
techniques for providing fire support in close proximity to ground
4
David A. Anderton, The History of the U.S. Air Force, (New York, Crescent
Books, 1981), p. 10.
5
Bill Gunston, American Warplanes, (New York, Crescent Books, 1986), p. 7-13.
4

forces. 6

Other developments such as in-flight aerial refueling, "blind

flying" cockpit instrumentation and radio direction aids for long range
navigation flights further increased the potential for aircraft in
combat. 7

World War II saw the proliferation of air power; the final

biplanes were phased out and by the end of the war jet-powered aircraft
along with the use of radar for tactical advantage opened the doors to
the future.

In 1944 alone the Department of Defense formally accepted

95,272 airplanes.

On 6 August 1945 a B-29 Bomber named Enola Gay

dropped the first atomic bomb ever used against an enemy on the
Japanese city of Hiroshima, and the world entered a new age of
incredible yet dangerous power.

"The war was won by all the armed

forces of all the Allies, but never again would any sane observer
underplay the central role of air power in human conflict." 8
During the post-World War I I years, the development of aircraft
expanded in several directions and was put to test at war in Korea,
Viet Nam, and Southwest Asia.

During the Cold War long range, jet

engine powered bombers were developed to provide deterrence for the
emerging nuclear threat along with aircraft specifically designed for
reconnaissance and surveillance.

Helicopters were brought into

military service and were quickly put to use in the Korean conflict
performing combat search and rescue, medical evacuation and troop
transport missions.
gunship mission.

In Viet Nam the helicopter's role expanded to the

Jet fighter aircraft pushed the Mach envelope and

during the war in Korea, in order to beat the Russian built MiG-15,
efforts were made to increase angle and rate of climb, and high
altitude maneuverability.

The ability to fly faster than sound seemed

Peter B. Mersky, U.S. Marine Corps Aviation 1912 to the Present, (Annapolis,
MD, Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1983), p. 20.
7
Gunston, p. 12.
8
Ibid., p. 16-19.
6

5

to lead naturally to supersonic warplanes, designed to reach speeds in
the 3-5 Mach range.

However, much of this development failed to

progress due to structural and human constraints.

While an airplane

can travel very fast or maneuver, it cannot do both at the same time.
The development of on-board systems to effectively give aircrews the
tactical advantage rapidly took center stage in the evolution of
military aviation platforms.

One early example was the F-86 Sabre,

which became the world's first automatic radar-directed all-weather
interceptor.

It could salvo rockets under computer control towards a

box of_ sky where the computer predicted the enemy would be when the
rockets arrived. 9

Today's modern fighters are judged not only on their

ability to out perform adversaries through maneuverability or speed,
but also on the performance capability of its weapons systems along
with its radar and sensor equipment.

The ability to remain undetected

(or "stealth technology") through either active or passive means has
also become a major design criterion.

As early as 1936 the "Father of

Radar", Sir Robert Watson Watt pointed out that in an electronic world,
survivability will increasingly depend less upon speed or altitude, and
"Unseen" in this context means

more upon trying to remain unseen.

invisible to the eye, undetected by radar or infrared, and not heard. 10
More and more on-board systems have been added to aircraft to increase
their combat effectiveness. Aircraft are tied in with other aircraft
and ground stations through tactical data links, which further increase
the information flow to the cockpit.

These data links enable aircraft

to be much more capable than were the original aircraft acting by
itself.

9

However, because many of the data link networks only serve a

Ibid. , p. 21-25.
Ibid. , p. 26.

10--

6

single service or mission area, only a limited portion of the U.S. air
forces are able to take advantage of the available information.
In a seemingly total separate development, the 1950s marked a
monumental transition in the United States from the industrial era to
the information era.

It was during this period that the number of

employees whose jobs were to primarily handle information surpassed the
number of industrial workers, and by the 1970s information workers
exceeded 50 percent of the entire work force. 11

As the flow of

information increased and information overload led to many operations
coming .to a standstill, organizations were forced to develop an
information systems management plan to sort out and prioritize data.
In the same sense, the need to develop a focused plan for
interoperability and management of all military aircraft platforms
under a single information systems management concept would unleash
immense potential not otherwise realized.
While the evolution of air power in a relatively short period of
time is somewhat of a phenomenon in terms of military weapons, the lack
of interoperability and compatibility has also caused severe
shortcomings.

Several of these shortcomings involved the

communications and network compatibility between aircraft and with
ground units.

During the 1991 Gulf War an Air Force AC-130 Gunship was

shot down resulting in the death of 14 airmen on board.

The AC-130,

which normally provided close air fire support to special operations
forces, attempted to provide support to conventional ground forces.
During the delay in linking communications between the ground force and
the aircraft, the AC-130 was unnecessarily exposed to enemy surface to
11

Barbara C. McNurlin and Ralph H. Sprague, Jr., Information Systems Management
in Practice, Fourth Edition (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, Prentice Hall,
1998), p. 2.

7

air missile fire and shot down.

In 1994 Air Force fighters on a combat

air patrol shot down two Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters killing all
26 on board in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq, partially due to
ineffective combat identification equipment and the inability of either
the fighters or airborne early warning command and control aircrew to
identify the existence of friendly helicopters in the area.

Each of

these incidents, while tragic, builds a stronger case for a common
information systems management concept among combat aircraft in the
U. S. armed forces to provide not only combat identification for
prevention of fratricide, but a common tactical picture for more
effective and efficient execution of air power missions.

In the fast

pace of modern warfare, the need for platforms to be on a common
network of communications cannot be overstated.

The time has arrived

for such a common information systems management concept.

8

CHAPTER III
METHODOLGY
This thesis was initiated on the ideal that a modernized method
of communications and information flow among various military aircraft
platforms could unleash a potential not yet realized.

The highly

successful modernization of information systems management within
organizations in the private sector gave birth to the idea that the
process in military ayiation could be immensely improved.

Research

began by analyzing various missions performed or supported by military
aircraft.

While critical battlefield information from various sources

often exists, getting it to the right platform or user at the right
time to achieve undeniable mission success falls short in many
instances.
After a basic concept for information systems management for
military aviation operations was developed by the author, a variety of
reference materials were explored to further refine and optimize the
original concept.

Initially, military doctrinal publications were

reviewed to present an overall understanding of how the military
expects to operate its aviation assets to achieve tactical success.
Several books focused on military aviation history were reviewed to
fulfill a perspective on where military aviation has progressed since
its inception.

Next, periodicals were searched for reviews of the

performance during recent and current military operations, along with
individual armed service proposals of projected modernization
requirements to include acquisition strategies.

In order to inject a

viewpoint with "best corporate practices" in mind, several modern
9

Information Systems Management textbooks were reviewed.

These provided

an "out of the box" perspective for military improvements based on
modern business practices.

Periodicals were vital for reviewing

current industry standards due the fact that computers, communications,
network capabilities, etc. are such a fast growing and changing sector.
The following subjects, while intricately related to such a
project, are considered beyond the scope of this research and were
therefore not discussed:
•

Cost of project development and implementation

•

Military Land and Sea network integration

•

Allied/coalition partner integration

•

Use of secure/encrypted communications

•

Challenges of transitioning to such a concept from
current communications networks

The end state of this thesis is a concept from which the
framework for an information systems management plan could be drawn.
Unknown factors that will undoubtedly arise in the future will force
the plan to be flexible and expandable; however, a solid foundation on
which the plan is based is required for any hope 9.f success.

10

CHAPTER IV

OVERVIEW OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT CONCEPT
In today's corporate world, the use of technology products is
widespread.

It is often the management and application of technology

that spells the difference between success and failure.

This statement

equally applies to utilization of information technology resources in
military aviation operations.

A classic information systems management

objective has been to."get the right information to the right person at
the right time. "

This goal was sufficient as early efforts to apply

information technology resources were incorporated into operations.
However, considering the potential of systems being offered today,
goals or objectives such as these are limited and shortsighted, and
must be taken a step further.

Even "the right information" objective

fails to ensure that something useful results from the delivery of
information.

A more appropriate focus for directing the use of

information systems in organizations is "to improve the performance of
people in organizations through the use of information technology. "12
The ultimate objective is performance improvement; a goal based on
outcomes and results rather than merely links or steps in a process.
The concept for an-information systems management strategy must
encompass full spectrum, end to end integration of modern information
systems tied through a robust network to all aviation users in the
military battlespace with appropriate links to higher headquarters and
external supporting agencies.

12 Ibid. , p. 12.

11

Before embarking on a concept for management of information in
military aviation operations, the basis for using information must be
Information serves two primary purposes in military

explored.
operations:

to help create situational awareness as the fou·ndation for

decisions and, to direct and coordinate actions in the execution of
decisions.

Two basic questions must be answered to effectively use

information management.
organization need?"

The first is, "What information does the

The second is, "What technology can be used to

manage this information?"

Unfortunately, both in the corporate world

and in the military, the tendency is to focus on the second question
while ignoring the first altogether.

Technological solutions are often

developed and fielded without a clear understanding of the actual
"problem" they are supposed to solve.

A recent survey by the firm

Ernst and Young of over 400 U.S. and European corporate firms
concerning the perspectives on information in the organization found
that 87 percent saw information as critical to their ability to
compete.

Even with this understanding, 44 percent of these

organizations felt they were poor or very poor at managing information.
The top three reasons stated for this assessment were the failure of
top leadership to emphasize the importance of information in the
organization, a lack of understanding of the organization's inf?rmation
management strategy, and the organization's structure creating an
institutional bias against freely sharing information.

Military

organizations are plagued by many of these same problems. 13
For military operations in particular, the model for a system
which supports information systems management in tactical aviation
operations should be based on a Decision Support System (DSS) defined
13

"Information Management," Marine Corps Gazette, (October 2002) , p. 12.

12

as a "computer based system that helps decision makers confront
problems or situations through direct interaction with data and
analysis models." 14

Figure 1 illustrates such an information flow model

developed as a four-step process.
The first step in this model is the collection of all relevant
data and information.

The data and information collected may include

but is not limited to the following:

all known friendly and enemy

force information for the theater of operations, operations orders or
the Joint Force Commander's framework for achieving military
objectives, weather and geographic data for the area of operations. The
data and information collected would quickly overload most users;
therefore, in the second step it must be processed and directed to the
right commanders and staff members for them to assess, make decisions
and further direct the course of the conflict. It is also during this

COLLECTION -Enemy, Friendly, Location
and Capabilities, Operation Plan, Weather,
Geography
PROCESSING -Sort, Refine,
Prioritize, and Categorize Data for
Decision Support, Build Common Tactical
Picture to Improve Situational Awareness
STORAGE -Information to Appropriate
Database(s) or Bin(s)
RECALL - Appropriate User Accesses
Information to Accomplish Military
Objectives. Assessments/Observations Are
Fed Back to the Collection Step
Figure 1
14McNurlin and Sprague, p. 368.

13

DECISION
Commanders Input:
Mission Intent to
Specific Target
Attack Guidance

USER ACCESS
Information is used
to Effect Results
and Accomplish
Militarv Obiectives

step that the processed information is used to expand situational
awareness by building a common tactical picture of the battlespace.
The processed data and information will be directed to an appropriate
storage location for future retrieval in the third step of the model.
The method in which data is filed for storage must support retrieval by
appropriate aviation users as needed during the execution of their
mission, thus completing the fourth step in the process.

Finally,

battle damage assessments and observations are fed back into the
collections step as the process remains in continual motion.
In reviewing lessons learned from current decision support type
information management systems, several challenges must be met to
achieve the ultimate goal of the system.

The first challenge is

achieving a common architecture for all users of the network.

Each

user interface must be viewed as a "window" into the information
database.

Common dialog architecture will allow access to all

information resources available.

Just as software for personal

computers is written to be compatible with one of the major operating
systems, applications on such a network must be compatible for
interface with all users on the network from the futuristic jet fighter
in the sky to the ground based forward air controller.

Secondly,

connectivity must be established with all users either participating in
operations in a particular military theater or all agencies supporting
that particular theater of operations.

Connectivity means the ability

to connect user workstations through a local area network (LAN) or even
wider links such as between LANs through an internet type network.
Connectivity also requires a bandwidth or data transfer rate to
accommodate the interchange of large files, graphics and figures,
digital images, photographs, and video.
14

Thirdly, data storage must be

organized in such a way that pertinent information (and only the
pertinent information) can be quickly accessed to support a battlefield
decision or pushed to an end user or "trigger-puller" to aid or enhance
accomplishment of a mission.

Whether using a data-pull or data-push

concept, sorting the data appropriately and defining the paths for
connecting data warehouses to data users is critical to achieving
success.

The final challenge is the further development and

integration of "Expert Systems" to analyze and sort data or solve
problems.15

In the way that a calculator solved for the previous "busy

work" performed on a slide rule, expert systems would be able to manage
or process the vast amount of data collected and provide succinct
answers to define what the data means to the user.
Remembering that the ultimate goal of an information systems
management concept is to improve performance through the use of
information technology, the first step in developing such a management
system must be to identify the information needs of the user.

A study

of the applicable military aviation missions and data requirements is
the starting point in determining the framework for information systems
management needs.

The following section will introduce the missions

and provide an overview of information and interface requirements.

15

Ibid. , p. 390-391.
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CHAPTER V
MILITARY AVIATION MISSIONS AND REQUIREMENTS
In an effects based evaluation process, performance by the end
user is often the yardstick by which a system is graded.

In order to

understand the level of results required, a study of the missions
performed by military aviation platforms along with the requirements
tied to each mission is warranted.

The six missions discussed below

are not an inclusive list of all missions which military aviation
platforms perform, however, to limit the scope of discussion the list
is representative of the most common missions performed and is
sufficient to reach the conclusion of this thesis.

It is an important

distinction that the missions discussed below are not directly linked
to specific aviation platforms in the current or future U. S. Military
inventory.

Each mission is performed by a variety of aircraft while

conversely most aircraft are designed or adapted to perform a multiple
array of missions.

It should also be noted that definitions used for

the missions described below come primarily from Joint doctrine.
Different services of the U. S. Armed Forces have alterations in the
definitions of these missions.
Counter Air
The function of counter air is to facilitate friendly operations
against the enemy and protect friendly forces and vital assets by
achieving air superiority or control of the air.

Air superiority is

defined as the degree of dominance permitting friendly aviation
operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference
16

from the enemy. 16

This mission is considered of utmost priority because

without air superiority, additional missions involving military
aviation assets can not be performed without unacceptable loss of
personnel or equipment.

Air superiority within a specified theater of

operations is defined by both location and timeframe of operations.
This mission is conducted through several means ranging from direct
attack by either ground or air launched munitions; suppression through
electronic warfare or a multiple array of passive measures.
Counter air is directed against enemy forces that directly
_ challenge control of the airspace (airborne fighters, surface to air
missiles, etc. ) or assets that affect airspace control indirectly
(airfields; petroleum, oil and lubricant facilities; production
facilities; etc. ).
separate categories:

Counter air is further broken down into two
offensive and defensive counter air.

Offensive

Counter Air (OCA) consists of operations aimed at destroying,
disrupting, or limiting enemy air and missile threats.

OCA operations

include targets such as enemy air defense systems, airfields, sea and
air based launch platforms, as well as command, control,
communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) nodes.

Defensive

Counter Air (DCA) is protecting friendly forces and vital interests
from enemy air and missile attacks and is synonymous with air defense.
DCA consists of active and passive air defense operations including all
defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy air and missile
threats or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attacks.
Information vital to. the counter air mission includes location,
status, and capabilities of enemy fighter aircraft; location, status

16
Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, (24 March 1994 ed.)

17

and capabilities of enemy ground based air defenses; as well as
specific details regarding enemy integrated air defense.system
networks.

Because of their speed and ability to create havoc with

their organic weapons, location ·of enemy fighter aircraft must be
available near real time.

Due to the high mobility of modern ground

based air defense systems, update of enemy ground based air defense
locations should be maintained within minutes of movement.

While

friendly air superiority aircraft are equipped with sensors to detect
air or ground based threats, they primarily depend on cueing from
airborne early warning aircraft or other surveillance assets.

Some

modern fighter and surveillance aircraft are able to share a common
picture through the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System or
link 16.

However, s ince not all aircraft or surveillance assets are

compatible or able to interoperate with link 16, not all friendly
assets are able to share, receive or participate in cooperative
engagements.

In a fully functioning network any aviation asset,

regardless of service or miss ion being performed, should be able to
access the most current tactical picture regarding enemy air threat
assets in a given area of operations and use this information while
conducting their respective miss ion.

In addition, aircraft performing

the OCA miss ion must be able to receive, in a timely manner, clearance
to attack from higher headquarters, especially when rules of engagement
are not clearly defined from the issued commander's intent.
Most platforms performing 'the counter air miss ion are fixed wing
aircraft (fighters and airborne early warning/surveillance assets),
which operate at altitude permitting effective use of line of s ight
(LOS) communications.

The current use of Very High Frequency (VHF) and

Ultra High Frequency (UHF) frequency bands prove adequate.
18

However,

-

communications with ground or even airborne command and control centers
may require an over the horizon (0TH) capability.

In this case a

requirement to use satellite links or other relay station means becomes
a requirement.

In tactical application, an airborne early warning

platform should be in flight at all times when performing the counter
air mission.

Maintaining LOS capabilities between the airborne early

warning platform and the fighters should be adequate, however,
providing an 0TH capability between the airborne early warning
platforms and both surveillance platforms and ground command and
cpntrol agencies will be an essential capability.
Ground Attack
Ground attack involves operations conducted to attain and
maintain a desired degree of superiority over surface operations by the
destruction or neutralization of enemy surface forces.

It can be used

to directly achieve military objectives through destruction or
neutrali zation of a target, as a preparatory or shaping action for
follow on operations, or in concert with friendly ground forces in a
fire and maneuver type operation.

It is generally broken down into two

separate categories, air interdiction and close air support (CAS) .

Air

interdiction encompasses air operations conducted to divert, disrupt,
delay or destroy the enemy's surface military potential before it can
be used effectively against friendly forces.

Air interdiction missions

may be conducted with the intent to strike preplanned targets or strike
targets of opportunity within a specified area of operations.

The

second category, CAS, is conducted to achieve the same objectives as
air interdiction; however, it is performed within close proximity to
friendly forces further requiring the detailed integration of each air
19

mission with fire and movement of friendly forces. 17

For ground attack

missions to achieve desired success, they must be coordinated through a
single Joint Forces Commander and from the impetus of this thesis, be
connected to the same information network. ·

Both fixed and rotary wing

aircraft perform the ground attack mission.
Information critical to the ground attack mission includes any
updates to the location or status of pre-planned targets or
identification and targeting details regarding targets of opportunity
located by ground forces or surveillance assets.

In the latter case,

this "sensor to shooter" link has received immense attention during
recent military operations and is the focus of many senior airpower
officials.

The U.S. Air Force has begun efforts to develop a Multi

sensor Command and Control Aircraft to perform the mission now being
done by several specialized aircraft.

Air Force Chief of Staff,

General John P. Jumper recently stated, "The objective is to shorten,
as much as possible, the 'find/fix/track/target/engage/and assess'
loop, which is our definition of the 'kill chain. ' [The goal] is to be
able to accomplish the part of this that relies on our sensors and
shooters-in less than 10 minutes."

If this can be done, he went on to

explain, ample time would become available for the commander to devote
to the "decision piece" of the engagement cycle-the time that's
normally consumed by such related considerations as the rules of
engagement in effect for a particular operation and the procedures to
limit collateral damage. 18

In addition to the targeting information

required to successfully perform a strike mission, information such as
current friendly ground force locations to include covert special
17

Joint Publication 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Close
Air Support, (1 December 1995 ed.)
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John G. Roos, "Holding the Heading, Interview with USAF Chief of Staff,"
Armed Forces Journal International, (May 2002), p. 41-42.
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operations teams, and fire support coordination measures in effect are
essential to be passed to a l l aircraft performing missions within a
theater's battle space.

Such a goal could only be achieved by fully

embracing a common information sharing network concept.

A recently

published naval document, "Naval Transformation: Roadmap, Power and
Access from the Sea. Sea Strike. Sea Shield. Sea Basing." supports
proposals for a transformational network concept.

This paper states,

"One approach being pursued focuses on improving battle space awareness
and reducing the time needed to carry out strikes against mobile
targe_ts_ b_y _spe_�ding the flow of information from intel ligence and
surveillance sensors to tactical controllers.

Future sensors will

include systems such as the Space Based Radar, Broad Area Maritime
Surveillance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and penetrating 'sensors, ' such
as the Ground Weapons Locating Radars... all interoperable with the Naval
Fires Network and Joint Fires Network." 19
Many times the spotter or ground forward air controller may not
be from · the same service branch as the aircraft conducting the ground
attack.
success.

Interoperable communications equipment is essential to mission
Long standing CAS tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP)

require a standard voice transmission from the ground controller to the
CAS a ircra ft , commonly referred to as the "Nine l ine brief " , for the

nine lines of essential information passed.

Technology for the

information contained in the nine line brief to be passed directly to
the CAS aircraft digitally is now available and reaching a mature
stage.

This technique holds great promise by eliminating the chance

for human error that is possible when transferring this information by

19

Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Inside the Ring, " Washington Times , (26
July 2002) , p. 10.
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voice, as well as building situational awareness both on the ground and
in the air by displaying additional location, status , and fire support
coordination information for both parties.

Air Force Chief of Staff,

General Jumper, has placed particular emphas·is on such a capability.
"Ideally, the information that's fed from the ground would be directly
entered into the airplane's weapons computer.

With that done, a pilot

would simply have to confirm the accuracy of the relayed information,
rather than enter the information on a keypad aboard the aircraft, as
is the case today."20

Technology will soon take the digital nine line

brief technique from the drawing board to the battlefield; however,
total success will not be realized unless all ground controllers and
spotters along with all ground attack platforms are equipped with
interoperable communications equipment.

A recent Department of Defense

Joint Test and Evaluation study of CAS techniques reemphasized this
point.

"A key element in the success of units integrating and applying

TTP for Joint CAS is the acquisition by different services of
interoperable equipment.

It is particularly essential for both voice

and data communications." 21

In the ground attack mission, 0TH

communications among participating platforms is an essential
capability.

Because time sensitive targets require immediate

attention, these orH capabilities must have the highest availability to
ensure mission success.
Air Assault
The air assault mission is the tactical movement of ground combat
forces throughout the battle space in conjunction with the ground
Roos, Armed Forces Journal International, p. 46.
Colonel David R. Brown, USAF, "Rethinking Close Air Support, " Armed Forces
Journal International, (February 2002) , p. 22.
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..

scheme of maneuver.

..
This mission is generally
associated with rotary

wing assault helicopters but could also be performed by fixed wing
aircraft through parachute operations or other aerial delivery
techniques.

Unlike counter air and ground attack, this is one of the

least digitally networked missions today.

One reason for this low

technology status is the perception that little coordination with other
units or surveillance systems is required because the mission merely
involves "flying trucks."

In reality , these aircraft are j ust as

likely as attack aircraft to have contact with enemy forces as well as
the fact . that it is essential for all maneuver elements to move in
concert with established fire support plans.

Once de-barked from the

aircraft that delivered them to the battlefront , ground forces must be

.

"
able to immediately
communicate with air assets for CAS and enemy
situation updates as necessary.

Continuous communications and network

updates with such air assets while embarked on assault aircraft is
essential to fighting in the single battle concept.
Information critical to assault aircraft serves two purposes.
First it updates the aircrews to enemy threats as well as friendly
positions and fire support plans in effect.

Additionally it is used to

continuously feed the ground force commander during his troop movement
and provide him the best situational awareness possible the moment he
steps off the aircraft.

In the reverse aspect , this link in the

network would also serve as the combat identification measure to
prevent possible fratricide incidents , such as the U.S. Army Blackhawk
shoot down in 1994 by friendly combat air patrols in northern Iraq.
Information essential to the air assault mission includes enemy ground
force and ground based air defense locations , as well enemy aircraft if
air superiority has not been achieved.
23

Friendly disposition

requirements include ground force locations, fire support coordination
measures in effect, and location of friendly air assets for collision
avoidance awareness.

Since these missions are often flown at night,

low level, in black out conditions, it is essential to provide the
aircrew with the app�opriate situational awareness tools.

The low

level nature of this mission also requires the capability for 0TH
communications capability.

There are often times when the separation

between users or effects of terrain masking prohibits LOS geometry
between air assault assets.

Additionally, ground force command centers

with a high interest in mission status require the �apability for
continuous progress updates.

During many mission scenario situations

there will not be airborne radio relay platforms available; therefore
an 0TH communications capability for the air assault mission will be
required.
Surveillance and Reconnaissance
The act of conducting surveillance and reconnaissance is the
oldest mission performed by aviation for military purposes.

It can be

described as the systematic method of obtaining, by visual observation
or other detection methods, specific information about the activities
and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or in securing data
concerning the meteorological, hydrographical or geographic
characteristics of a particular area.22

While early military

reconnaissance missions merely involved flying an airship or airplane
within visual sight of an area of interest, today's platforms
incorporate some of the most advanced technological systems available.
The wide array of platforms being used goes well beyond the single
22

Joint Publication 3-09 . 3
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piloted airplane and ranges from satellites and unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV) to commercial airline equivalent aircraft with a host of
specialized sensor equipment and highly trained aircrew.

It is the

information gathered by such platforms that feeds a large portion of
the national intelligence structure.

These platforms are often kept

clear of harms way through altitude or stand-off range, or the use of
stealth technologies, with the possible exception of UAVs .

A secondary

or implied mission of all military aircraft, however, is the reporting
of any relevant enemy location or activity identified while performing
the respective primary mission.

A sophisticated network is required to

link the information absorbed by the sensors of reconnaissance aircraft
(human and electronic ) to national reconnaissance sources so that the
information can be processed and distributed appropriately.

Because of

the remote location of sensors or assets performing this mission, 0TH
communication links are essential and must be thoroughly integrated
into the theater communications plan.
Tactical Airlift
Tactical airlift encompasses the logistical movement of personnel
and supplies into a theater of military operations or within rear areas
of the area of operations .

A primary distinction between thi s mi ssion

and air assault is that tactical airlift is merely the logistical
staging of personnel or supplies while the air assault plan is embedded
in the tactical scheme of maneuver.

The importance of logistical

movements, however, cannot be underestimated.

For without logistical

support to military operations, all activities for a given area of
operations would come to a screeching halt.

Tactical airlift is

supported by large military transport aircraft for the deployment and
25

sustainment of personnel, equipment and supplies into a military
theater of operations.

Intra-theater tactical airlift may be supported

by fixed or rotary wing aircraft and involves the redistribution of
personnel, equipment and supplies within a theater.

Status of

logistical build-ups transfers directly to in-theater troop strengths,
which may be a determining factor or "trigger point" for commanders to
decide when to commence a particular operation or delay.

Additionally,

logistical sustainment during an operation may dictate the pace at
which an operation progresses.

Critical decisions by battlefield

commanders hinge on knowing .the quantity of troops, . supplies ,. ..and
equipment (i.e. manifest or packing list ) , where they are presently,
and when they are expected to arrive at a particular destination.
Present day shipping companies have advanced the capability to provide
customers with around the clock status of their shipped goods.

The

same concept must be applied to airlift into and throughout a military
theater of operations in order to provide military commanders and
planners with the critical information required to execute plans.

The

information network is the ideal means to transmit all essential
information during tactical airlift.

In addition to providing troop

manifests, and supply and equipment packing lists, the network could be
used to divert or re-prioritize shipments.

It could also be used to

update troop commanders on board airlift assets, enabling them to
receive continuous operational updates to ensure they are ready to hit
the ground running upon arrival.

The great distance traveled by

tactical airlift assets dictates the use of 0TH communications.
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Command and Control
Command and control (C2) is the battle space management process
of planning , directing , coordinating and controlling forces and
operations.23

It may include ·the management of all forces during a

specific mission in an area of operations or it may be limited to the
control of aviation assets alone.

Command and control of military

forces by definition is not a mission , but rather a function performed
by military headquarters from strategic down to the tactical level.

C2

is addressed with the other mission areas in this section because the
platform that often houses the headquarters performing C2 is considered
a C2 platform.

While the most common C2 headquarters are ground or sea

based , for shorter periods of time during a limited scale operation or
for C2 of a limited sector of operations , an airborne platform may be
utilized.

Airborne platforms used for this function may range from

commercial airline equivalent aircraft equipped with a complete command
center suite to a much smaller aircraft with a single mission commander
having voice transmission capabilities alone.

Aircraft may also act as

the critical relay node for command and control functions where direct
line of site communications is not possible.
The most important product of a C2 headquarters is a deci sion
intended to create progres s towards achievement of a mil i tary
objective.

One goal of incorporating information technology into a C2

system is to achieve increased situational awareness to facilitate the
decision making process.

A discussion of C2 system elements required

to create increased situational awareness can not be complete without
detailing the components of a C2 system.

For at least 50 years the

Department of Defense has defined C2 systems as :
23
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" ... the facilities ,

equipment, communications, procedures and personnel essential to a
commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of
assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned."

When forming a

network designed for communications it is easy to focus on the
"hardware" aspects of such an acquisition, i. e. the facilities,
equipments and communications from the list given in the definition
above.

Any effort to create a C2 system that ignores or overlooks the

other two critical aspects, procedures and personnel trained in these
procedures will have significant problems.

Information overload rather

than increased situational. awareness. . would be one of the apparent
downfalls.2 4

Therefore in creating the management concept for

networking of C2 systems, the procedures to manage information must be
published with the arrival of the hardware which makes up the network.
By the same token, personnel trained to carry out the prescribed
procedures must be available to run a C2 network.

Without all

components in place, the potential of a network based C2 system will
never be realized and in turn will eventually lead to its failure.
C2 platforms are the "hub" of military operations.

They must be

able to receive information from a host of sources, ranging from the
surveillance and reconnaissance assets providing enemy force
disposition and location, friendly positions and status, as well as
orders and intent from higher headquarters .

Because C2 platforms must

be able to communicate globally, a robust 0TH communications capability
is a must.

C2 platforms will also require the large_st bandwidth

allocations because of the vast data and information they must transmit
and receive.
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Interfaces and Human Factors Considerations
The paramount obj ectives expected from a wel l -designed
cockpit interface include reducing crew workload associated with
weapons engagements, intelligence reporting or mere conduct of the
mission along with improving situational awareness for all crewmembers.
Crew workload may be described as a state the pilot' s or aircrew
experience when meeting the demands of tasks imposed by the system,
given the limited mental resources that he has available.

Flying in

combat can often produce either actual or perceived workload to an
excessive degree, which can lead to any of the following adverse
effects on performance :
•

Performance in high workload tasks may degrade

•

The pilot or aircrew may "shed" tasks

•

The pilot or aircrew may be forced to shift strategies to
perform tasks differently2 5

Like workload, situational awareness may be considered an
experienced state that cannot be directly measured except on subjective
scales, but which has a direct impact on performance.

Situational

awareness refers to the pilot or aircrew' s awareness of the transient
changes in the state of the aircraft systems, location, environment or
progress of a particular military operation, such that he will be able
to react appropriately if unexpected circumstances require a quick
response to those states.

Situational awareness and workload are often

related to each other, in a reciprocal fashion, through the "fulcrum"
of automation.

That is, automation, which is often designed to reduce

25 Jon Weimer, Research Techniques in Human Engineering ( Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey, Prentice Hall PTR, 1995), p. 117 .
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workload by requiring the operator to do less, may degrade situational
awareness by pulling the operator out to the loop, thereby curtailing
an engagement in which the necessary cognitive activity had previously
forced the operator to remain current with system states.

Reducing

workload can also work in a positive manner in that reducing the
workload associated with certain tasks may allow the aircrew to more
easily absorb information and perform required tasks, thus increasing
situational awareness.

Whether in the management of aircraft systems

and flight paths for the pilot, or in providing assistance and guidance
as an air support or terminal aircraft controller, a major design
challenge of operator interfaces is to establish ways of reducing
workload to appropriate levels, while building vice destroying
situational awareness.26

One example of using advanced technical

systems to both reduce workload and enhance situational awareness was
the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency's " Pilot Associate"
program .

This program attempted to integrate computer technology,

decision support systems and artificial intelligence into an
intelligent interface that could be used by pilots of tactical aircraft
to increase operational performance by reducing physical and mental
workload while increasing situational awareness.27

Pursuit of similar

designs to achieve an increase in aircrew performance and efficiency
will be a primary consideration when enacting an information systems
management concept.
Considerations with regard to pilot or operator interface vary
with the particular mission being performed, the information being
provided, and most importantly the environment within which the user
26 Ibid.
, p. 1 1 8 .
27
Ibid., p. 4 1 7 .
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performs his duties.

For example, the interface standards and

requirements for the pilot of a single seat aircraft vary significantly
from a ground based forward air controller.

Even the requirements of a

systems operator in the cabin of an airborne command and control
platform vary significantly from the dynamic needs of the pilot.
Regardless of the platform, a few basic requirements must be met.
The gateway for delivering information to a particular platform
is a data link capability with the capacity to receive and transmit
data at a rate commensurate with providing a common tactical
battlespace picture in real time.

This common picture should be

displayed on a color multi-function display (MFD) of sufficient size to
allow readability and avoid fixation by the aircrew under day, night or
adverse weather conditions.

Most cockpits will require two or more MFD

units per aircrew in order to present both the common tactical picture
along with aircraft performance status.

Various display options should

be easily selectable, preferably without requiring aircrew to remove
their hands from the primary flight controls.
As augmentation to the MFD, consideration should also be given to
incorporating a heads-up display (HUD) or helmet mounted display (HMD)
to further provide information, cueing and alerts to the pilot or
ai rcrew whi le preserving the capability to maintain an out side the
cockpit reference scan.

HUD devices have long been used in tactical

fixed wing aircraft, primarily as a pilotage and targeting reference.
HMD devices have been predominantly used in rotary wing aircraft but
also more recently in fixed wing aircraft with the advent of off-bore
sight weapons capabilities.
functions:

HMDs typically perform the following

1) display pilotage or gunnery imagery from image

intensifier or Forward Looking Infrared sensors, 2) present
31

strategical, tactical, and operational data on demand, and 3) sense
eye/head position and motion for the purpose of designating targets,
directing sensors and weapons, and activating switches.

Well designed

HMDs should enhance aircrew situational awareness and increase mission
effectiveness. 2 8
The final cockpit interface needed to support the information
systems management concept is some type of feedback device from the
pilot or aircrew back into the network.
cockpit keypad device.

This is typically done with a

Unfortunately, because keypads require a pilot

. to remove one hand from the primary flight controls along with a heads
down movement, keypads can adversely increase pilot workload in flight.
While keypads may not be totally eliminated, emerging technologies
should be considered to reduce dependency on them.

Such considerations

should include but are not limited to hands-on-control interface
devices, voice recognition and touch screen technologies.
Ground command and control centers, tactical air direction
centers and forward air controllers must also be considered for similar
interfaces.

Of importance, the personnel on the ground must have the

capability to display the same common tactical picture of the
battlespace, as well as access other relevant information to perform
their duties .

The ability to communicate back into the system with a

keypad or similar device also applies.

This is especially relevant for

the forward air controller to send final attack guidance to ground
attack assets.
Commonality of pilot and aircrew interface devices throughout
military aircraft should be a major acquisition concern.
28
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Command, 1999), p. 12 .
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among platforms will not only reduce development costs, but also
streamline upgrades and expansion as future technologies emerge .

Other

military avionics upgrade philosophies which should reduce costs and
aid in keeping pace with new technologies include the following:

open

system architectures that provides maximum flexibility in choosing
component suppliers, dual military specification and commercial data
busses and input/output systems, maximum use of Commercial Off the
Shelf (COTS) technology and computer processors using PC-based
architecture.2 9

29 Nicholas c. Kernstock, "New Cockpits for a New Threat, " Rotor and Wing,
(April 2002), p. 18.
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CHAPTER VI
INFORMATION PROCESSING AND DECISION MAKING
Information processing is perhaps the most important step in an
information management decision support system.

Collection assets now

have the ability to quickly overload decision-makers and end users,
which if not managed properly, can lead to a breakdown in the command
and control process.

"Overwhelming levels of raw intelligence from a

range of sensors could lead to paralysis rather than decisive action.
The ability of leaders to assimilate real time combat data and sort out
vital information will be critical to success." 3 0

Developing a plan fo�

the act of processing information is critical . to mission success ; the
goal of which is to provide the decision makers and end users of the
information with a complete set of applicable information, yet only the
information that is applicable to avoid information overload.

To

further understand this challenge, the differences between the terms
data, information, and knowledge must be •defined.
facts.

Data is comprised of

Information is data in context ; it ' s meaning depends -0n the

surrounding circumstances or usage. Knowledge is information with
direction or intent; it facilitates a decision or an action. 31

To put

these definitions into an applicable context, data may be the raw
picture taken by a military surveillance asset.

It becomes information

when the location of a surface to air missile threat is extracted from
the photo.

It further becomes knowledge when it is determined that

this threat may be in range to shoot down friendly aircraft, therefore
it must be defeated before friendly air operations will be permitted in
30
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that area without the risk of unacceptable losses.

The goal of

information processing is to decipher data and create information,
which supports knowledge.
The actual act of processing information can be very time and
manpower intensive.

Information management specialists, personnel with

both the operational background to decipher the relevance of inbound
data and the technological background to divert information to the
users who need it, are critical in this function.

However, with the

amount of data flow now available from advanced surveillance and
intelligence gathering sources, the military can not depend on having
the manpower to perform this processing function in a timely manner.

A

solution from the world of information systems management that should
be explored is the use of so-called Expert Systems .

An Expert System

is a term for the real world use of artificial intelligence, a group of
technologies that attempts to mimic our senses or emulate certain
aspects of human behavior such as reasoning and communicating .

An

Expert System is a type of analysis or problem-solving model, almost
always leveraging computer technology that deals with a problem the way
an "expert" does.

The solution process involves consulting a base of

knowledge or expertise to reason out an answer based on characteristics
of the problem .

I t s purpose is to offer advice or solutions for

problems in a particular area.

..
The advice is comparable
to that wh ich

would be offered by a human expert in that problem area .

Some of the

specific uses expected from Expert Systems include assisting
information management specialists with the flood of data, managing or
directing the flow of processed information to users or data storage
bins, diagnosing problems and supplying information needed to make
35

decisions.3 2

In the rapid pace of modern conflicts, well-designed

Expert Systems to process data into useful information will be critical
to the success on an information systems management concept.
The ultimate goal of information processing must not be lost
while developing high technology decision support or expert systems.
The needs of the information users, whether military commanders and
decision makers, aircraft controllers, or pilots and aircrew
themselves, must remain the primary focus.

Information provided to

specific users should further enhance execution of a mission or support
making decisions.

It must be relevant and timely, organized and

succinct (i.e. presented so as to not overload the pilot of a single
piloted aircraft ) , and presented with sufficient background to enable
the user - to turn information into knowledge.

A well-designed

information processing solution may even allow for streamlining of the
organization of military units and supporting agencies.

32 McNurlin and Sprague, p. 423, 424, 4 3 6 .
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CHAPTER VII
NETWORK CONNECTIVITY
While exploring the importance of network connectivity, one must
consider the significance of Metcalfe's Law, formulated by networking
pioneer Robert Metcalfe.

Metcalfe's Law:

The utility of any network

is a square of the number of users attached to it (Utility = Users 2 )

•
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Networks, whether of computers, rai lroad track, or speakers of a
particular language, exert a kind of gravitational pull and the more
nodes they have, the stronger the pul l.

The more members attached to a

network, the heartier and more useful it becomes.
network effects was the early railroads.

An example of poor

Early railroads in the United

States did not settle on a standard track gauge unti l the 1 8 8 0's,
making interconnections between lines in the North and South
compl i cated, slow, and expensive.

The Internet on the other hand is a

shining example of networ k value.

The Internet is the network of the

Information Revolution, a growing body of networking standards and
other software that allows devices of all kinds to share information,
not just data but video, voice, and someday perhaps taste and smel l.
The network's spread over the last ten years has demonstrated the
Internet is the platform on which businesses can be built. 34

While the

Internet is obviously not the network on which information management
for military aviation can be built, it is a positive example of what
direction to take.

The network must have a standardized protocol and

be accessible to all networ k users (i. e. a l l mil itary aviation

Larry Downes, The Strategy Machine (New York, HarperCollins Publishers, Inc,
20 02) , p. 22.
34
Ibid., p . 24 -25.
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platforms and supporting agencies ) .

The more users, the more

information will be shared and thus increased utility for all
(Metcalfe's Law ) as well as increasing efficiency for the senior
military commander by ensuring all units under his control share the
same information.

The network must have the bandwidth to preclude

virtual chokepoints or gridlock of information passage.

A network

system that bogs down and does not allow the timely passage of
information is of no use on the fast-paced modern battlefield.

The

network must also have the continuity to ensure all users are available
on the network at any given time through the use of appropriate
transmission means and relay stations as required.

A breakdown in the

availability of any given user's ability to maintain a constant
information flow on the network could spell sure disaster and cost
lives.
Historical Use of Network-Centric Warfare
The use of networks to enhance the capabilities of military
forces is not a new concept.

The idea of network-centric warfare

relies not only on organic sensors, but on a common tactical picture
created by integrating enemy intelligence products and the friendly
order of battle.

With this picture, operators can synchronize actions

without requiring minutely detailed written orders.

Given the

situational awareness offered by a netted picture, decisions can be
made quickly and precisely.

During World War II, U.S. and British

naval fleets respectively developed combat information centers and
action information centers, which gathered tactical pictures using on
board sensors and off-board data.

Later, computers were to automate

the process of assembling the picture to show more potential targets
38

and the associated digital link make dissemination possible in near
real time.

Thus computers and data links, a revolution in naval

affairs of the 19 60s, determined the extent to which ships could
cooperate tactically. 3 5

Digital tactical computers went to sea in the

19 60s to receive, display and exploit a shared (netted) tactical
picture.

British and Dutch navies, in addition to the U. S. , developed

parallel systems and the tactical picture that ensued was shared by a
standardized digital channel called link 11.

This enabled dispersed

naval formations to operate together in network-synchronized fashion. 3 6
While 9reating a common tactical picture generates numerous tactical
advantages, it potentially creates additional problems as well when
operating with units not tied in to the network .

During Operation

Desert Storm, only NATO member countries and Australia possessed the
link 11 data sharing capabilities and associated tactical doctrines.
When operating in the air defense zone of the northern Persian Gulf,
other participating coalition warships could not share in the tactical
picture, nor could land based U. S. Army Hawk air defense missile
batteries.

Even mine countermeasure ships were not connected into any

computeri zed tactical picture even though they carried antiaircraft
weapons.

Fortunately, Iraqi aircraft flew few sorties, and the

coalition air force was protected largely by a rigid rule that surface
to air weapons were not to be used. 37

For all of the money, personnel

and effort dedicated to the air defense mission, much of it stood near
useless for fear of shooting down a friendly aircraft.

Modern tactical

aircraft accomplish a netted common picture through the Joint Tactical
Information Distribution System or link 16.
35
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is spread across the services to both U.S . Air Force and Naval
aircraft, shortcomings still exist because it is limited primarily to
tactical jet aircraft therefore still not providing the common tactical
Lessons learned from the past

picture to all aviation platforms.

reveal that achieving true network-centric solutions cannot be realized
without a common data network.

Because of constantly changing world

conditions and the price of doing business, it would be near impossible
to provide a common network for all allied partners.

However, it is

essential to ensure that all U.S. armed forces are able to "log on" and
receive the common tactical picture.
Bandwidth
The classic definition of the term bandwidth is "the frequency
range occupied by a transmitter signal." 38

With the evolution of

information technology and the heavy flow of data among various users
by both hard-wired and wireless means, bandwidth has become the coined
phrase of choice to describe the amount of data which can flow through
a particular pipeline at any given moment.

Relating the flow of

information to the motor vehicle transportation network, the more lanes
provided on a particular information highway, the more data that can be
passed in a given period of time.

As advanced sensor technology has

increased the resolution or definition with which information can . be
gathered on a particular subject, i.e. a hostile target of interest,
the ability to 'transmit that information to decision makers and end
users has become stretched.

As an example just one Global Hawk UAV, an

advanced unmanned surveillance and reconnaissance platform used in the
war on terrorism in Afghanistan, consumes approximately 500 megabits
38
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per second of bandwidth, or about five times the total bandwidth
consumed by the entire U. S. military during the Gulf War. 39 One can
quickly surmise that whi le the abil ity to gather detai led tactical
information by a particular sensor is highly significant, without the
means to transmit that information to a particular user, the
information effectually becomes useless.

Even if specific data flows

are temporarily shutdown for "time sharing" on the network to allow
transmission of only the most time sensitive information at any given
moment, delays of other significant information wi ll cost overal l
. combatant theater effort.

Addition�l solutions to conserve or remain

within bandwidth l imitations lead to degraded capabi lities of weapons
systems.

Mi litary officials have quoted that during the current war on

terrorism "Global Hawk controllers have been forced to turn off some of
the aircrafts ' sensors and transmit fuzzier, lower quality video. " 4 0
The current mismatch between bandwidth requirements and bandwidth
capacity . stems from two significant issues.
increase in demand for bandwidth.

First was the un-forecast

"In February 2 0 0 0, the Defense

Science Board, the Pentagon' s internal think tank, concluded that the
mi litary would need an average of about 16 gigabits per second of
bandwidth-the equivalent of about 2 0 8, 0 0 0 simultaneous phone calls-to
fight a maj or war in 2 010.

Today, the proj ected requirement, which is

classified, is 'significantly higher than what we forecast' says a
mi litary official who is heading a study on the Pentagon ' s
communication needs. "

"Demand for bandwidth continues to grow as the

services develop more data intensive weapons systems. " 4 1

The second

issue in the dilemma is shortage of satellite capacity to pick up the
39
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communications workload.

" In the 1990s, the U.S. military bet that by

2005 almost 1, 000 new satellites would be available for weapons such as
Global Hawk that rely on space-based communications.

But the

commercial satellite industry, which the Pentagon was counting on to
launch those satellites, fell on hard times.

Of the 675 launches

expected between 1998 and 2002, only 275 satellites reached space."
"Fiber-optic cable, which carries huge amounts of information in the
form of light beams, ruined the plan.

It proved a cheaper and more

reliable way of moving gigabits of information around the globe.
Scores of companies built fiber-optic networks spanning the world,
creating a bandwidth glut that has contributed to the demise of many
telecommunications companies.

The cable didn't help the m�litary,

which needs wireless connections to tanks, planes and ships.

But the

surge in fiber-optic networks hurt the satellite companies, which have
had to cancel, scale back or postpone new satellite launches." 42
Improvements in bandwidth capacity have progressed with recent
demand.

The MILSTAR I satellite system launched in 1994 -1995 carried a

voice only, low data rate ( 2. 4 kilobits per second } capacity, while the
next generation MILSTAR I I satellites feature a faster medium data rate
( 1.5 megabits per second) capacity.4 3

The following example highlights

the practical application of these capabilities:

"Two older MILSTAR I

satellite versions could take an hour to transmit a 1. 1 megabit air
tasking order while the just launched Block II version can do the same
job in 5 seconds.

Annotated 24 megabit intelligence images, which can

take 22.2 hours to transmit on MILSTAR I, can be transmitted in 2

42
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minutes by the MILSTAR II version, and j ust 24 second via the Advanced
EHF satellite expected to come online in 20 0 6. " 4 4
The Department of Defense is currently on track with recognizing
the need for transformational communications capabilities.

" ' We are

now fighting a different kind of war and our military communications
architecture needs to take that into account, ' quoted an official at
the U. S. Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center.

The new warfare

'is with combined U. S. forces, local coalition forces and international
forces. '

Smooth communications interface is increasingly needed

between such diverg�nt units, but not necessarily possible with today's
spacecraft and ground terminals.

'A leap in capability is required to

meet the rapidly increasing demand for bandwidth and connectivity. '" 4 5
The major point to be drawn from this discussion is that bandwidth
capacity appears to be the weakest link in current information
management networks.

For any future networks to . reach fruition and

truly become successful, bandwidth capacity requirements must be met
and designed from a global perspective to meet the specifications of
all perspective users.
Transmission Media
Radio frequency communications have been the standard
transmission means since communications evolved beyond visual or hard
wire communication methods.

Aviation platforms have traditionally used

the VHF, UHF and High Frequency (HF) bands.

HF transmissions have the

advantage of providing an over the horizon capability through the use
of sky waves where the transmission i s reflected off the ionosphere,
Craig Covault, "U. S. Mil itary Wants Sweeping Satcom Changes, " Aviation Week
and Space Technology, ( January 21, 2002 ) , p. 2 7.
45
Ibid. , p. 27.
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however, this frequency band is also adversely susceptible to
atmospheric propagation and disturbances.

Amplitude modulated

transmissions in the UHF and VHF ranges use ground waves which may
extend a short distance beyond the horizon.

Frequency · modulated

transmissions in the VHF range are limited to line of sight
capabilities only. 4 6

Distance limitations and limited frequency band

allocations for the number of users has created problems with radio
frequency transmissions.

As discussed in the previous paragraph on

bandwidth, within a defined frequency band, there is only a limited
amount of data that can be transmitted or received .in a given time
period.

Radio frequency transmissions will continue to be the backbone

of military aviation communications; however, other transmission means
will be required to augment a robust information sharing network .
Military aviation platforms and supporting ground systems must be
mobile and expeditionary by nature.

This is one reason hard-wire

communication links between users is not normally an option to connect
users such as aircraft, ships or ground vehicles .

However, the

capabilities of fiber-optic networks are significant and should be
examined for use in areas for which a hard-wired network can support
operations.

Fiber-optic transmissions, which carry huge amounts of

data in the form of light beams, can provide significant augmentation
to ground based C2 platforms and supporting agencies that do not have
the requirement to be highly mobile in a military theater of
operations.

In concert with the increased bandwidth capacity produced

through the use of fiber-optic networks, technology is maturing to
allow LASER communications to become the connectivity link between
fiber-optic networks and other mi l itary users via satellite re lay.
46 The World Book Encyclopedia, vol. 16, p. 88.
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Further development of LASER communication technology has the potential
to produce a transmission means, which can carry far more information
and data than traditional radio frequency .

"Substantially increased

development of LASER communications may achieve the capacity of
hundreds of gigabits per second. " 4 7

"LASER links are inherently jamming

resistant because the beams are small and would be di fficult for an
adversary to isolate. " 48

LASER communications are not immune from

additional concerns that must be addressed before the technology is
truly mature .

"Shooting a LASER beam from space to an orbiting

aircraft is fraught with challenges, in part because beams are degraded
by moisture in the atmosphere. " 4 9

"Because space-to-ground beams would

be susceptible to atmospheric conditions, multiple ground stations
would be necessary to mitigate this impact. " 50
The Department of Defense is currently studying proposals to
incorporate a robust network by leveraging the increased capabilities
of fiber-optic and LASER technologies .

A "proposed LASER satellite

system, referred to as the transformational communications system ( TCS )
is designed to increase the bandwidth available to the military by
linking ground based fiber-optic cables to space using LASERS to
transmit data to and from the ground, and between satellites .

A study

led by the De fense Department ' s National Security Space Archi tect
office found that the technology for such a system was mature,
technology wise and feasible . " 51

The vision of the Department of

Defense is emphasized by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
47
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Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, Mr. John Stenbit.
He stated, "The network changes will comprise three key elements:
satellite LASER communication cross-links and down-links; a robust
fiber-optic network to connect ground terminals; and 'non-channelized'
satellites that no longer divide the electronic spectrum into separate
channels via filters, and are, therefore, able to provide more usable
bandwidth.

The changes will focus on wide-band communications, but

will also affect to some extent the extremely high frequency (EHF) and
narrow-band ultra high frequency (UHF) satellite systems.

The goal is

to make a very wide-band, worldwi9e network, on the one hand, to get
information back from sensors, and on the other, to get information out
to users that are in the neighborhood of where those sensors were in
the first place."�

If applied for all applicable users, the vision

stated above should provide the necessary connectivity to ensure a
military aviation information systems management concept that has the
available transmission paths to assure mission success.
Relay Stations
One of the severe limitations to communications whether the
transmission means is by radio frequency in the VHF band or higher and
even LASER transmissions is the requirement for transmitter and
receiver stations to maintain LOS geometry.

Due to LOS limitations of

most radio frequency bands currently used along with LASER
transmissions as well, a relay station is often required.

Air Force

officials propose an additional method of signal relay by use of assets
that see near round the clock usage whenever combat aircraft are
airborne, aerial refuelers or "tankers."
52

Secretary of the Air Force

Sirak, Jane' s Defence Weekly, (January 30, 2002 ) .
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James Roche foresees an ancillary mission to aerial refueling whereby
' smart tankers' carry communications relay equipment in addition to
other intelligence support gear. 5 3

With an already over tasked

satellite network, Air Force Chief of Staff General John P. Jumper
suggests to "take advantage of what ' s already there, " referring to the
tanker fleet for the communications relay mission as a substitute for
additional satellite constellations. 54

A separate proposal was

developed during a Navy and Marine Corps war game scenario at the Naval
The command and control group

War College in Newport, Rhode Island.

for the war game determined that a "tactical communications relay
should not require a terrestrially based infrastructure that requires
additional manpower and will increase force protection and security
requirements.
based.

Moreover, the relay capability must not be satellite

Over reliance on satellites may create an opportunity that a

potential adversary might elect to attack.

Desirable characteristics

include all-weather, manned or unmanned, unattended, tamper resistant,
and a 24/7 performance capability. "

The solution the group came up

with was an "UAV-like system with a communications relay payload to
extend line of sight communications... " 55
The aforementioned concepts each address key points that must be
cons idered for any system int ended t o extend the l imit a t i ons o f LOS

communications.

Regardless of whether the method to extend

communications range is provided by a satellite, tanker, UAV or a
combination thereof; it must be robust enough to operate in the
tactical environment under all weather conditions, capable of
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supporting bandwidth requirements, and available on continuous coverage
to meet the demands of all forces in the military theater.
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CHAPTER VI I I

DATA AND INFORMATION STORAGE
In addition to the processing of data into useful information and
network connectivity between military aviation users, the storage and
organization of data and information for later retrieval is equally
important.

Information must be organized and stored in a manner from

which it can be retrieved quickly and efficiently as needed by the
appropriate user.

First used during the 1970s in corporate database

management systems, the function of Data Administration was created to
manage all the computerized data resources of an organization.

Data

Administration was fashioned out of the necessity for organizations on
the verge of or beyond data overload to clean up the data "mess n
produced when the inbound flow of information far exceeded the ability
to manage it . 5 6

The function of Data Administration includes not only

the broad function of administering databases filled with useful
in formation, it also includes providing compatible data definitions
whereby information can be shared across organizational boundaries to
all applicable users.

The data dictionary is the main tool by which

data administrators control standard data definitions.
are entered into the dictionary.

All definitions

Data administrators monitor all new

definitions and all requests for changes in de finitions to make sure
that overall organizational policy is being followed.

Data

Administration has four main functions to bring order to raw data and
information :
•
56

Clean up data definitions

McNurlin and Sprague, p. 198.
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•

Manage data distribution

•

Maintain data quality

•

Control shared data

57

Each of these main functions will be explored further in the context as
each applies to data administration within the military aviation
information systems management concept.
Information pertaining to military aviation takes many forms.
It includes the broad operations orders and air tasking orders, which
include the overall commander's intent or guidance down through
specific unit assignments.

Additionally fragmentary orders update or

amend the original orders or further specify direct mission
assignments.

Information such as friendly and enemy unit locations

along with capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses must be maintained
for the theater of operations.

Targeting information as well as

specific mission abort or continue criteria are also critical.

Even

perishable information such as current weather conditions is important
to be properly stored, distributed or removed from the database when it
is no longer applicable.

Data definitions must support all information

and be designed to provide for each user's needs .

For example,

information relevant to a fighter aircraft conducting the counter air
mission at 18, 0 0 0 feet may include location of enemy fighters and
medium altitude surface to air missile launchers, location of friendly
aircraft in his engagement zone, weather at altitude for the duration
of his patrol, and the commander's current rules of engagement for
firing on enemy aircraft.

Information relevant to a helicopter gunship

conducting _ the ground attack mission on the other hand, would include
targeting details, location of friendly ground forces, location of
57
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enemy low altitude surface to air missile threats, and weather at 500
feet and below.

The data administration function of cleaning up data

definitions must be responsive for defining which users have the
potential for using any particular information and then effectively
labeling it in such a way that it can be recalled when necessary.
Management of data distribution presents one of the most
significant challenges to the data administrator.

There are situations

where a data-push process is most relevant and necessary while other
situations dictate a data-pull process to avoid an overload of non
critical information in the cockpit.

Using the example of the

helicopter gunship in the previous paragraph, specific changes to the
preplanned target information or emergence of an enemy surface to air
missile threat in range of affecting the helicopter should be pushed
immediately to the cockpit.

On the other hand routine weather updates

or movement of friendly forces well outside of his engagement area
should only be pulled if the pilot desires .

Information distribution

on this level would require very detailed data definitions and a
complex set of rules governing when information should be pushed versus
information that only needs to be ready for distribution if pulled.
Maintenance of data quality ensures only the most accurate
information is distributed to the appl icable users.

Certain perishable

information such as weather should be overwritten so that the old data
is completely rem?ved.
locations.

The same applies for enemy or friendly force

Some data will be overwritten when updated; others must be

completely removed from the database if it is no longer applicable.
Data definitions must be flexible enough to allow amendments, even if
temporary in nature, such as when a particular anti-air missile unit's
capabilities are degraded when its respective search radar stands down
51

for a 2 hour maintenance cycle, yet the amendment must be removed when
the temporary condition no longer exists.

Whenever information

changes, some form of quality control must update the information
database.

Considering the incredible amount of data and information

stored in this database, this will not be a simple task .

One possible

solution is to ensure the original owner or processor of the
information is responsible for updates and revisions ( i. e. the weather
support agency for weather observations and forecasts ) , however, data
quality control will remain an overall data administrator duty.
The final data administrator function is control of shar�d data.
In the ideal situation all information within a military theater of
operations will be based on the same data architecture where data
definitions and distribution are defined for all possible users.
However considering the many diverse participants in military
conflicts, this ideal situation is highly unlikely.

With non

Department of Defense national intelligence agencies and foreign
coalition partners or allies involved, the requirement to share
information with other organizations will definitely exist .

To take

advantage of all participants' capabilities, whether they are
intelligence sources or additional military forces, the ability to
share the information produced and stored will be a significant data
administration task .
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CHAPTER IX
ACQUISITION STRATEGY AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
The National Security Act of 1947 paved the way for joint or
multi-service operations by formalizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff
structure.

Until this monumental change in military organization,

warfighting responsibilities were delegated directly to Army or Navy
representatives.

The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 198 6

clearly established the operational ch�in of command that runs from the
President and Secretary of Defense { the National Command Authority )
directly to the Commander in Chief of the joint combatant commands that
divide the world into regional warfighting areas of responsibility.
"Joint" in this context is a permanent or temporary force structure
comprised of more than one military service.

The significance of this

act was that it effectively removed individual service chiefs from
direct warfighting responsibilities and placed these responsibilities
with the joint combatant commands.

Unfortunately, the complete intent

of Goldwater-Nichols has not been realized as envisioned because
individual services continue to struggle with "jointness."

Individual

services tend to " l ink speci fic weapons and communication systems to
activities regarded as most vital to their missions.

Therefore they

seek to optimize the . integrated performance of systems according to
their needs rather than those of the j oint community.

As a result, as

combatant commands attempt to integrate and apply service optimized
systems, they discover that service optimization produces sub-optimum
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performance within the joint oper�tional framework. "�

" Technologies

developed since Desert Storm should have decreased decision cycle times
and increased the ability to achieve battlefield effects more
efficiently and effectively by employing joint capabilities during the
1999 Kosovo air campaign.

But joint command and control concepts and

procedures did not fundamentally change, and U. S. forces were unable to
exploit opportunities offered by new technology. " 5 9
One reason for the absence of joint effort among the services is
the way in which services receive funding for respective weapons and
communications systems.

Currently funding �s given directly to the

individual services for them to establish spending priorities and make
acquisition decisions for individual programs and platforms.

This

system has led to a sacrifice in the overall warfighting capability
provided to the joint combatant commands.

"Current shortfalls in joint

interoperability should not be surprising, since warfighting
capabilities are still developed, for the most part, in service
enclaves with little incentive to integrate them with the capabili�ies
of other services. " 60

If more joint control was exerted over service

research, development, and acquisition, transformation to new
structures for warfighting could occur.

" If information superiority

and battlespace dominance are the organizing imperatives that can
determine how the services will fight in the future, then new joint
operational concepts and joint-capable organizations are keys to
success. " 6 1
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Success in the building of an information systems management
framework for military aviation can only be achieved if the concept is
developed "j ointly" from its inception.

This begins by assigning the

responsibility for development of the concept to a Joint Program
While the previous paragraphs have highlighted the negative

Office.

impact of j oint growing pains, the following will provide positive
examples and discuss additional concerns for interoperability and open
systems architecture.
Joint Program Office
A Joint Program Office, fully in control of its own share of
funding, will be a necessary step in further developing an information
systems management concept for military aviation operations.

The

acquisition process required to bring such a concept to fruition must
be focused on supporting an overall j oint mission area rather than
supporting the development of individual aviation platforms.

In this

way the mandate is to provide a j oint capability for the use of air
power rather than an improved radio or data link for a particular
aircraft.

Air Force Chief of Staff, General John Jumper, has recently

portrayed this idea for Air Force acquisition programs.

He stated, "My

contention is that we have too long been program and platform centric .
Especially as you get into this advance information technology age,
that sort of thinking mitigates against the sort of integrated thinking
that you have to have in order to deal with the sophisticated problems
we face on the battlefield."

Under the general's new approach the

first order of business is to write a concept of operations or outline
for each mission area .

"Deciding how we are going to fight before we

go out and decide what we are going to buy to fight with.
55

In the old

construct we went program by program and platform by platform,

'higher,

faster, farther', but without much consideration of how we were going
to integrate with the other services, with coalition partners or
allies.

So this simply inverts the process... it tries to put the

operators into the lead of what we program and buy in our air force."�
Defining acquisition products based on joint mission area requirements
will ensure systems are built to accomplish a defined mission, versus
developing advanced systems independently and then letting the
warfighters figure out how to operate them on the battlefield to
achieve military goals .
The war on terrorism in Afghanistan has provided a success story
in the process for which equipment is acquired for special operations
forces.

"In 1986, Congress consolidated all U . S. special operations

forces under the newly created Special Operations Command (SOCOM).

The

Joint Special Operations Command oversees the Army's Green Berets and
Rangers, Navy SEALS, as well as Air Force special tactics units along
with other units.

Unlike other military units, Congress provides

separate research, development and acquisition funding directly to
SOCOM to develop equipment uniquely suited to its specialized
missions . " 0

Using the special operations joint mission area as an

independent acquisition focus allowed the forces in Afghanistan to be
equipped with the best equipment to accomplish their mission.
A positive example of the Joint Program Office concept is the ·
development of the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS).

This program is

built around the plan to field a revolutionary family of interoperable,
multi-band radios to support communication requirements of all four
62 Michael Sirak, "Interview with General John Jumper : U . S . Air Force Chief of
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military services.

JTRS is designed to replace all of the U. S.

military's 750, 0 0 0 tactical radios with a single family of affordable,
interoperable radios that will perform their many diverse functions,
ranging from battlefield voice and data communications to long distance
satellite communications. 6 4

For decades the principle method to

transmit voice over radio wave was to operate similar types of radios
on the same frequency.

As additional techniques for delivering

communications were developed (i.e. encryption for secure
communications, frequency-hopping for anti-jam communications, and
local area networks for data transfer ) , interoperability probl�ms were
created by scores of proprietary waveforms and the lack of
standardization between vendors' software architecture .

In 199 7 the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Computers and
Intelligence chartered an integrated product team to evaluate radio
procurements across all of the services.

The integrated product team

determined that the Department of Defense would achieve a greater
economy of scale and joint interoperability with the development of a
single family of radios that could meet all the services' operational
requirements instead of each service buying individual legacy system
replacements.

These efforts were the genesis for the development of "a

family of digital, modular, software-programmable radios" to be known
as the JTRS. 65

While the JTRS program took control of radio procurement

out of the hands of individual services and in some cases caused
extended delays in the replacement of outdated legacy systems, in the
long run all services will be better equipped to interoperate in the
joint environment.

The JTRS Joint Program Office by design has been
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.able to leverage rapidly advancing COTS technology which was not
possible with the single-function design of legacy systems. 66

The most

important concept drawn from the JRTS example is that the system was
developed on the joint mission area of battlefield communications,
versus an afterthought radio used in a particular aircraft or ground
vehicle.

JTRS would be an integral component within the overarching

information systems management concept for military aviation.
The same Joint Program Office practices that have made JTRS
successful up to this point will undoubtedly pave the way for future
joint-- acquis-iti-on endeavors.

The principles of supporting a joint .

mission area must be applied to the theme of air power dominance when
developing the information systems management concept for military
aviation.

The vision to procure and sustain a system that supports an

entire joint mission area must be met.
Mandated Interoperability
Joint Publication 1-02 defines in teroperabil i ty as "the ability
of systems, uni ts or forces to exchange services and... operate
effectively together. "

In tegra tion is generally considered to go

beyond mere interoperability to involve some degree of functional
dependence.

For example an in tegra ted mission planning system might

rely on an external intelligence database for functionality, while
in teroperabl e systems can function independently.
something less than interoperability.

Compa t ibi l i ty is

It means that systems or units

do not interfere with each other' s functioning, but it does not imply
the ability to exchange services .

In sum, in teroperabil i ty lies in the

middle of an "integration continuum" between compa tibi l i ty and full
66
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in tegra t i on. 61

A problem with military hardware is that most of it was

never designed with interoperability in mind; in fact for some
platforms compatibility was an after thought that required additional
engineering modifications and funding to correct.

Sometimes, even if

compatibility or interoperability was considered in the design phase,
it was only carried out within one mission area or military service,
leaving a natural firewall between other services of the U.S. Armed
Forces or the military forces of allied countries.
this is combat identification.

A prime example of

The Air Force has long had "friend or

foe" transponders for its aircraft, and its next generation tactical
data link system, link 16, is designed to augment that capability.

The

Air National Guard, however, which flies alongside Air Force aircraft,
has its own program, the Situational Awareness Data Link, which relies
on frequency space borrowed from an already clogged Army communications
system.

The Navy, like the Air Force, has a reliable air-to-air

system, but it is not designed to coordinate with ground force systems.
In fact, a June 2001 audit performed by the General Accounting Office
documented that none of the U.S. services' combat identification
equipment is designed to work as an integrated system, nor are the U.S.
systems capable of working with those of allies. 68

Interoperability as

defined by Joint Publication 1-02 must be a design considerat ion from
the onset for the military aviation information systems management
concept.

Whether communicating friendly combat identification

information or providing a common battlespace picture, interoperability
among all users will be mandatory for success.
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Open Sys tems Architecture Structure
A discuss ion of a s tructure based on an open sys tems architecture
approach firs t requires a proper definition of these terms with respect
to the acquis it ion process .

Architecture is the structure of

components, their interrelat ionships and the principle guidelines
governing their design and evolut ion over t ime .

An open sys tem is one

that implements specifications maintained by an open, public consensus
process for interfaces, services, and support formats, to enable
properly engineered components to be ut ilized across a wide range of
systems with minimal change, .to inter.operate wi.th other - components on
local and remote sys tems, and to interact with users in a manner that
facilitates portability . 69

Open _sys tems assure, provide, and are the

bas is for interoperability; they enable properly engineered components
to be ut ilized across a range of sys tems .

Open sys tems architecture

means the software is portable in the sense that its use is not
dependent on specific hardware plat forms or operat ing system software .
The maj or benefits of open sys tem architecture are :

(1) costs are

reduced through information sharing, interoperability and portability,
(2) the poss ibility of us ing commercially available software or reus ing
software developed for other systems is increased, and (3) change is
easier to track throughout the software life cycle . 7 0
The Department of Defense is already underway with an superb
example of the open systems architecture required for the future with
the JTRS program .

As previously - discussed, the need for JTRS stemmed

from the incompat ibil�ty of the milit ary's current inventory o f legacy
radios, which could not all talk to each other because of the 3 3
69
Glossary o f Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms, Defense Systems
Management College, (Eighth Edition, May 1997), p. B-8, B-79.
1u \\ Intermediate Systems Acquisition Course, Student Guide, " Defense Systems
Management College (Volume 2, July-September 1998), p. SMO l-24.
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different waveforms and numerous frequencies on which each model
relied.

To assume an open architecture principle, JTRS will be based

around a "software defined" radio, akin to a computer with a radio
"front end".

Its communications functions are to be based in the

radio's software, not in its hardware as with most legacy systems.
This open system Software Communications Architecture (SCA) is a set of
specifications that details the design rules for JTRS components and
their interconnections, essential to effective interface between
various radios. 7 1

Whether a radio's purpose is to provide the

communications backbone for an Airborne Command and Control platform, a
warship on the high seas or an individual foot soldier, the JTRS
program will help ensure unquestioned connectivity in the joint
theater.
The open systems architecture example of JTRS must by expanded in
use by all facets of warfighter connectivity to ensure network-centric
warfare brings forth the synergy of forces that can only be attained
through the interoperability of all assets.

Open systems architecture

will guarantee acquisition of systems from defense contractors remains
upgradeable for future increased performance , competitive through its
non-proprietary interfaces and protocols, and expandable with industry
recognized interfaces and software standards.

All of the devices used

to form the concept, from cockpit and ground station interfaces to
information processing and relay stations must follow suit with an open
systems architecture structure.

It is one of the critical principles

needed to bring the concept of information systems management for
military aviation assets to fruition.

71

Goodman, Armed Forces Journal International, p. 44.
61

CHAPTER X
CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this thesis was to develop an information
systems management concept that would improve the overall performance
of military aviation during combat operations.

The information

requirements of commanders, decision making staff members, aircrew and
aircraft controllers were reviewed for the missions areas of Counter
Air, Ground Attack, Air Assault, Surveillance and Reconnaissance,
Tactical Airlift, and Command and Control.

Considerations for 0TH

communications requirements were discussed within each mission area.
Minimum operator interface requirements included a suitable MFD
connected to the network via an on-board data link and a keypad for
data input; highly desirable options included a HUD or HMD to
supplement the MFD, and a hands-free input device to supplement the
keypad.

The model in figure 1 of chapter IV proposed the four steps of

collection, processing, storage and recall along with decision inputs
to the processing step; this model presented the information flow path.
Beyond "what" information was required for "who", the "how" and "when"
to deliver requisite information determined the baseline as a starting
point for this concept.
Stepping outside of typical military planning doctrine, corporate
information systems management was reviewed and discussed for relevance
to this concept.

Decision Support System models with the application

of Expert Systems for processing data and information to prevent
information overload and organizational paralysis fit well into the
concept for military aviation.

Lessons learned in the information
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systems management field showed that a supporting network must be
reliable, available, robust and designed with standard protocol for
common access.

The system must be designed with the bandwidth capacity

to support all required voice and data transmissions to avoid network
chokepoints and gridlock.

Providing connectivity through a combination

of radio frequency, LASER, and fiber optic transmissions should satisfy
foreseeable requirements.

Relay networks to assure 0TH communications

should take advantage of available resources to include satellites,
airborne refueler aircraft, and UAVs.

The data administration strategy

to manage and store data and information must develop data definitions,
which categorize data and define what information pertains to a
particular user.

This strategy must incorporate a set of rules to

apply data-push versus data-pull techniques.

Quality control must be

exercised over the database to ensure only the most current and
relevant data and information is provided to applicable users or stored
in the database.
Finally, to bring this concept to reality, an acquisition
strategy must be developed for the joint mission area of airpower
dominance and supported by a Joint Program Office.

This construct will

ensure funding is directed towards supporting the joint mission area
and not just individual programs or platforms that form mi l itary
aviation.

The JTRS program has shown what can be accomplished when a

system is developed with "Joint" operations as a goal from the ground
up.

Any future system must be interoperable with all U.S. armed

forces' aviation platforms, and consideration should be given for a
plan to include allies and coalition partners in times of conflict.
Open systems architecture is one way to plan for the ability to be
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expandable ; it also ensures maximum competitiveness among vendors to
support this system throughout its life cycle.
This concept will require maximum flexibility to adjust as
teqhnologies emerge that could better support - it.

If implemented

correctly , the concept holds the potential to unleash a synergistic
potential not yet · realized by today' s most advanced systems.

Increased

combat effectiveness and efficiency along with a reduced possibility of
fratricide through a common network for· combat identification make this
a concept that will transform future military operations.
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CHAPTER XI
RECOMMENDATIONS
The first step towards implementing an information systems
management concept for military aviation will be for the Department of
Defense to fully embrace the concept at the Joint Chiefs of Staff
level.

Acceptance at the highest level will be necessary for

implementation to affect all military aviation systems.

A concept this

far-reaching would call for all armed services to be committed to
working towards a common vision.

Several key elements will be required

to bring the foresight of this concept to reality.

The following

recommendations highlight the major tasks that should be accomplished.
First, a Joint Program Office should be established to manage the
development and implementation of the system.

This Joint Program

Office must be provided with adequate funding and resources to
accomplish the entire undertaking.

The leverage of the Joint Program

Office will ensure all armed services receive a system that is
interoperable while meeting the requirements of each combatant
commander's warfighting needs.

Furthermore, with a mandate from a

Joint Program Office , a l l armed services wil l be required to de sign or
adapt their respective command and control infrastructure around
accepting and supporting such a system, while implementing its use down
to the lowest level.

A key function will be to ensure the hardware and

systems owned by each individual service are interoperable with and
support the system developed from this concept.
While not specifically discussed in this thesis, cost will be a
significant factor in the outcome of the final product.
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In order for

the final product to be successful, management of the program during
the potentially expensive research and development stage must be
resourcefully accomplished.

The program should capitalize on currently

available and maturing COTS technologies that are relevant and
transferable.

While COTS products will not fulfill all program

requirements, their usage will allow the bulk of research and
development funding to be focused on program requirements specific to
military usage.

A final system integrator should ensure both COTS

products and those specifically developed for military applications are·
melded to generate a seamless product.
The final and possibly most critical recommendation is to ensure
sufficient "operator" representation on the product development team.
The "operator 11 in this context should be experienced aircrew, · decision
makers or otherwise end users who are intimately familiar with military
aviation mission requirements.

These duty experts should represent all

facets and mission areas of military aviation.

Their participation

must go significantly beyond merely providing survey input regarding
mission �equirements and system performance expectations.

The

"operators" must work side by side with the designers, engineers and
technicians while the system is developed.

This is especially true for

the development of the Expert Systems requireq to manage the vast
amount of information that will be received and processed.

The system

has the potential to provide massive quantities· of in_formation to
various users; information overload will counter-act the entire purpose
for providing the system in the first place.

An experienced "operator"

is essential to describe. for the engineer or designer what information
is relevant and which excessive information will cause saturation to
the point of negative contribution for the heavily engaged aircrew or
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decision maker.

The end product from a well-integrated operator

designer team holds the greatest potential for significant increases in
efficiency and performance from modern military aviation assets.
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